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0. Introduction 
On an otherwise ordinary day, we may listen to a contemporary philosopher 
question Immanuel Kant's ideas and respond to them. We may see an ad with a 
picture of a missing pet that asks us "Have you seen me?". Or we may lose our 
keys and ask ourselves "Where did I just put them?". In actuality, a modem-day 
philosopher cannot bring Kant to the modem era to engage in simultaneous debate 
with him. A missing pet cannot talk to those who are looking for him. And 
nobody can be split in two parts and have the two selves interact with each other. 
However, cognitive linguists, and more specifically mental space and conceptual 
blending researchers, have shown that such apparent impossibilities do occur and 
are even quite common at the conceptual level (Fauconnier & Turner 1996, 2002; 
Lakoff 1996). This paper deals with the use of imaginary or fictive questions of 
the sort exemplified above as argumentative devices that can structure on-line 
discourse and reasoning in legal settings. The theoretical perspective used is the 
theory of conceptual integration networks or conceptual blending (Fauconnier & 
Turner 1996, 1998, 2002). 
1. Conceptual integration networks 
Conceptual blending is a theoretical framework of on-line dynamic construction 
of meaning. The basic cognitive operation involved in blending is the 
combination of two or more input spaces to produce another space, the blend. 
That space inherits partial structure from the input spaces and has emergent 
1 Field research and data analysis were supported by a predoctoral grant from the Fulbright 
Foundation. I have benefit from general comments and brainstorming from Aaron V. Cicourel, 
Gilles Fauconnier, Ed Hutchins, Theo Janssen and Frederike van der Leek during this research. I 
am also thankful to all the informants in the project, especially to the district attorney in this trial, 
who offered insightful introspective views on his own discourse. I am grateful to Frederike van 
der Leek and Line Brandt for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. Whatever 
errors the paper contains are of course my own. · 
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structure of its own. Conceptual integration networks are constituted by mental 
spaces (Fauconnier 1994 ). These are mental constructs of potential realities, 
which are being set up as discourse unfolds. Spaces are structured by elements, 
which represent conceptual entities, and they are enriched by cultural models and 
frames. Frames are structures of role-value pairs like the family, a debate or a 
conversation.2 The integration of a frame as an input space with some roles that 
are mapped onto certain kinds of elements as values in another input space 
constitutes a so-called simplex network (Fauconnier and Turner 2002). A theory 
of mental spaces and conceptual blending is extremely useful for an account of 
legal argumentation, since, as Tannen (1998) points out, the very kernel of the 
adversary system is the different meaning constructions of the same objective 
reality by the counsels of each side (see also Goodwin 1994). 
2. Analysis 
The data discussed below comes from an ethnographic study of a lawyer's closing 
argument to the jury in a high-profile murder trial which took place in a California 
court in the fall of 2000.3 The defendant was accused of brutally killing his wife 
with a fire poker in the couple's home. Two examples will be discussed, in which 
the lawyer produces a question that sets up an imagined communicative 
interaction. These are: a) the response to a rhetorical question that the counsel of 
the opposite side was supposed to have uttered; and b) the predicative use of an 
interrogative sentence type as a definition. 
2.1. Rhetorical questions, asked and answered 
Rhetorical questions challenge us with an interesting paradox. They are clearly 
not information-seeking, and yet they are produced as interrogatives, which are 
conventionally associated with question asking. This paradox becomes 
particularly intriguing if one considers the frequent use of rhetorical questions in 
communicative contexts like litigation, in which the compulsive force of the 
argument does not leave much room for unnecessary embellishment. Indeed, 
rhetorical questions are extremely common argumentative devices in the 
courtroom (cf. Hie 1994), and they are actually recommended by legal tacticians 
to both lawyers and witnesses alike (cf. Casanovas 1998; O'Barr 1982; 
2 See Coulson (2001) for a detailed explanation of frames, and the operation she calls frame· 
shifting. 
3 The data was collected within the project "An ethnographic approach to discourse processes in 
court" (# 020033S), reviewed and approved by the UCSD Human Subjects office. Ethnography 
included: i) participant observation, ii) official transcripts, iii) written and visual media coverage, 
v) official documents, and vi) interviews with the main legal professionals and lay participants. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all informants, whose participation in the study was 
entirely voluntary. In order to protect the confidentiality of both the informants and the persons 
referred to in the transcript, all names have been changed. 
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I.C.D.A.' 104). I assume the following characterization of rhetorical questions 
(Pascual 2001, to appear): i) they constitute a pragmatic rather than a 
grammatical category (Ilie 1994); ii) they are to be heard as questions but 
understood as statements (Ilie 1994); iii) they suggest a clash between two 
presupposed scenarios; and iv) they set up an imaginary trialogue in which a 
communicator a attempts to convince b that e's argument is incorrect. In this 
section I explore the conceptual blends behind afictive rhetorical question asked 
and answered by a lawyer. The example to be discussed, extracted from the 
prosecutor's closing argument, is the following (my italics): 
(1) Now, Mr. Loeber [defense counsel] questions, "Well, how could the blood 
get on the end of the poker, because the poker is not hitting her in the 
head?"[ ... ] The reason why blood gets on the end of the poker[ ... ] is 
centrifugal force. 
In this piece of discourse the lawyer appears to respond to an actual question 
previously raised by his adversary. If one looks at the argument referred to, 
however, it turns out that such a question was actually never produced. Instead, 
what had been said was (my italics): 
(2) And we know from Dr. Stone's [spatter expert] testimony and from our 
own common sense, when we look at these unfortunate, sad photographs 
of Rachel [victim] from the coroner, that there were no wounds there that 
correspond to the end of a fire poker. They're linear wounds. That's why 
we have linear, linear, linear. But to get that castoff spatter we have to 
have blood on the end of the poker, and that would get there most likely --
we've had no other explanation -- by the end of the poker hitting Rachel's 
head. 
In (1) the utterer presents the whole passage above condensed in a single 
sentence, a rhetorical question that he then proceeds to answer. When interviewed 
after the trial and asked to comment on that passage, the prosecutor explained that 
his adversary "was saying that, you know, if it was a poker, why aren't there 
poker marks in her head?". He then concluded: "so, I was just responding". Note 
that not only did the defense counsel not produce any of those questions, but that 
the argument to which the prosecutor is responding occurred a good forty-five 
minutes prior to his response. Moreover, they both appear embedded in long 
monologues addressed to the jury. In order for the question-answer operation in 
(1) to occur at all, the whole interactional sequence, that is the discourse by the 
prosecutor and the defense counsel respectively, needs to be merged with a debate 
4 The 10th annual l.C.D.A. Trial Skills Academy, held at the California Western School of Law. 
April 21st-28th, 2001. Ethnographic notes. 
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frame into a simplex network (Fauconnier & Turner 2002). One input contains the 
debate frame with turntaking and participant roles and no values, and the other 
input contains unframed elements, namely the actual arguments produced and the 
two lawyers. The inputs are then matched by a Frame-to-value connection. 
- Conversational tum a. ____________________ - DA's closing argumen 
-Conversational tum b. ------------------------ _____ - DC's closing argument 
Conversational tum c ______ ---------------------- ______ - DA's rebuttal 
A " t D.A. 
Communicators B _.:.:::::::::i;:: :-:::::~·:::-.::::::::: :::::--- ! Jury . 
c \ I D.~. 
D.A.: District attorney 
D.C.: Defense counsel 






 I // 
I 
__,,_ __ / / ' 
\ / I / -0.A.'~ co~versjon/i / 
\ tum \ " 1 ( 
\ -D.C's ~.,esponse / 
\ -DA 's \ ! \co~n.terresponse ! 
SPACE 
Fig. 1. Closing arguments phase as debate blend. 
Each communicative phase in a trial (e.g. closing argument, direct- and cross-
examination) seems to be regarded by participants as a single tum in an imagined 
debate with the opposite side. Thus, each communicative turn is to be responded 
to by the adversary's subsequent tum, which may then be further countered by yet 
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another turn. The "closing argument-debate" network seems to be a conventional 
blend in the courtroom. In the American legal system this is overtly manifested in 
different interactional phases: "direct" vs. "redirect" and "cross" vs. "re-cross" 
examination; and "closing argument" vs. "closing argument rebuttal". 
Significantly, in the redirect, re-cross and rebuttal phases, one can only discuss 
issues that were brought up in the prior direct-, cross- and closing argument 
respectively. This feature is directly projected from the debate frame. It should be 
noted that the conceptualization of subsequent monologues as a simultaneous 
interaction is not restricted to the legal setting. Communicative participants often 
seem to conceptualize subsequent communicative performances, both written and 
oral, as different turns in a larger conversation-like structure. A well-known 
example from the conceptual blending literature which seems to undergo that 
process is Fauconnier & Turner's Debate-With-Kant (1996, 2002), mentioned in 
the introduction. A discussion between two philosophers of different centuries 
presents no problems at the conceptual level, couched as it is in terms of the turn-
taking pattern of the ordinary face-to-face conversation. 
Once the overall closing argument phase of the trial is condensed into a 
sequence of turns in a debate, the projection of a question-answer pattern as in ( 1) 
becomes almost self-explanatory. What seems less obvious is the fact that the 
rhetorical question in (1) should be immediately followed by a response.5 
However, under a non-derivational paradigm like the one adopted here, the very 
possibility of responding to a rhetorical question - even a fictive one - is easily 
explained by the hypothesis that rhetorical questions are questions, and that they 
are question uses rather than kinds (Ilie 1994). Notice that no linguistic means 
indicates that the question in (1) is to be understood as rhetorical. At the same 
time, the power of responding to a rhetorical question seems to derive from the 
fact that these are still to be understood as statements, albeit heard as questions. 6 
5 The production of a rhetorical question only to be subsequently answered by the same utterer 
seems to contradict the definition of rhetorical question as those that "do not expect an answer," 
given by some some scholars and the 1988 edition of the Longman Dictionary of the English 
language rhetorical (see Ilie 1994: 42). 
6 A similar example of a response to a rhetorical question raised by the adversarial counsel in a 
prior closing argument comes from a criminal trial in a Spanish court. The defense was arguing 
that since the defendant and the victim were suffering from deep financial problems, the defendant 
had aided the victim in committing suicide. The private prosecutor confronted this version of the 
facts with a rhetorical question: "Quien no sufre par problemas econ6micos?" ["Who doesn't 
have financial problems?"]. When his turn came, the defense counsel quoted thi_s question - as 
rhetorical - and responded to it, in a way that was consistent with his explanation of the facts: 
"Quien no sufre par problemas econ6micos?, nos dice la acusaci6n particular. Yo se lo dire. No 
sufre por problemas econ6micos una nifia de diecisiete aiios. No tiene que sufrir por problemas 
econ6micos" [who doesn't have financial problems? Says the private prosecutor. I will tell you 
who. A seventeen-year old kid does not have financial problems. She shouldn't suffer from 
financial problems.] Data from GRES (UAB Sociolegal Studies Group). 1997. El Informe del 
Abogado de la Defensa ante el Jurado. Juicio por Asesinato. Video code: T25.jj.4. 
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Let us now zoom in and focus on the particular elements involved in the blend 
prompted in (1). The prosecutor's memory of the argument he attempts to attack, 
which runs through many sentences, is compressed into one. This compression 
must be allowed by some commonality between the two elements that get mapped 
and blended, namely the counsel's argument in input one and a rhetorical question 
frame in input two. First, if rhetorical questions are truly pragmatic categories and 
to be "heard as questions but understood as statements", then it follows that for 
the argument in (2) to get compressed into a rhetorical question it must be 
readable as both a question and a statement. Second, if the argument of the 
defense counsel is to be fully integrated with a rhetorical question frame, then it 
should also "suggest a clash between two presupposed scenarios". Lastly, the 
argument in (2) should prompt an "imaginary trialogue in which a communicator 
a attempts to convince b that e's argument is incorrect". The basic categorization 
of rhetorical questions does seem to match with the skeletal structure of the 
argument in (2). The counsel is making two explicit statements: a) "there were no 
wounds there that correspond to the end of a fire poker", and b) "we have to have 
blood on the end of the poker". By so doing, the counsel is pointing out the 
contrast between two mental spaces: a) a reality space in which the victim's 
wounds do not seem to correspond to the end of a fire poker, and b) another 
reality space in which blood spatter suggests that there must have been blood at 
the end of the poker. Both reality spaces are structured by frames and cultural 
models ("our own common sense"). The latter scenario is structured by a cultural 
model of force-dynamics. In the blend, there is an inner space cause-effect 
mapping linking the end of the poker hitting the victim's head with blood at the 
end of the poker (and subsequently blood spatter found by the investigators and 
experts). By presenting these two contradictory scenarios, the defense counsel 
challenges the prosecution's theory of the case. According to the prosecution, the 
fire poker that is missing from the couple's home corresponds to the murder 
weapon that was never found, a claim the defense wishes to cast reasonable doubt 
upon. If the blood spatter shows that there must have been blood at the end of the 
poker, and the victim was not hit with the end of a poker, then the question surely 
arises: how could the weapon have been a poker? 
Lastly, the space-builder that introduces the question in (3), the verb "to 
question" rather than "to ask" indicates a rhetorical rather than an answer-seeking 
use of the question. This verb choice frames the defense counsel's verbal space 
within a confrontation rather than an information-seeking frame, which is 
consistent with the confrontational feature of rhetorical questions assumed here. 
Notice that in the adversary system, the role of the defense is not to prove the 
defendant's innocence, but rather to convince the jury that there is reasonable 
doubt as to guilt. At the same time, the prosecution will argue the defendant's 
guilt before the jury, beyond the possible doubt of which the defense may have 
convinced the jury. The basic communicative structure of confrontational 
argumentation, and then surely of the courtroom, fits perfectly with the skeletal 
structure that characterizes rhetorical question use: "communicator a attempts to 
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convince b that c' s argument is incorrect. 
To conclude, it seems that producing an imaginary rhetorical question that one 
ascribed to one's adversary, and subsequently responding to it constitutes a 
powerful means of persuasion. It brings the issue under dispute and the legal 
theory of the case to human scale, while at the same time it highlights the very 
adversarial structure of confrontational communication. Moreover, the whole 
network is supported by culturally meaningful conceptual blends. 
2.2. A how-to definition: The law vs. the application of the law 
In this section I focus on a definition with interrogative syntax. In particular, 
deal with the predicative use of a question in the litigator's definition of a legal 
term to the jury. The analysis will be in terms of an imaginary or fictive question 
that reproduces the nature of jury deliberation. The piece of discourse to be 
discussed is: 
(3) Express malice means, simply, was it an intentional killing, okay? 
This utterance was produced early in the prosecutor's closing argument. At this 
point, the district attorney is telling the jury about the laws that govern jury 
deliberation, and is giving definitions of the charges that they will have to accept 
as proven or not. What is most striking about (3) is of course the use of an 
interrogative sentence type as a definition. The structure used is basically: NP + 
means+ YES/NO INTERROGATIVE, whose semantics can hardly be looked upon as 
informative. In contrast, the judge's definition of that same term, "express malice" 
in his instructions for the jury in that same case was simply: "the unlawful 
intention to kill a human being". Let us have a look at the discourse immediately 
surrounding the utterance in (3): 
(4) Express malice means, simply, was it an intentional killing, okay? [ ... ] 
Did the person who killed think about it? Did they have a choice? [ ... ] But 
what premeditation and deliberation really mean is, was there weighing? 
Did the person doing the killing consider what it would do to the victim, 
what it would do for him? [ ... ]Well, let's apply this. If you apply it to this 
case, was there planning? Of course there was planning. 
First, a set of questions are produced in order to explain the meaning of "express 
malice" and its related terms "premeditation and deliberation". Then, the 
definitions are "applied" to the case at hand. Such an application is through an 
introductory question, "was there planning?", which is subsequently answered in 
the affirmative by the utterer himself, "Of course there was planning". Even 
before the attorney gets to this final question-answer pair, it seems that by merely 
explaining the meaning of legal terms through questions, he is already 
simultaneously teaching the jury on the law and reasoning with them on the kinds 
of decisions, the kinds of questions that they will be confronted with in 
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deliberation. There seems to be a conceptual blend involved, in which the 
definition of the term gets fused with its application. A similar example is 
provided by the defense counsel in that same case: 
(5) What beyond a reasonable doubt means is that when you look at the case 
in totality, do you know, do you have any reasonable doubt as to whether 
or not the defendant inflicted these injuries on Rachel. 
In that case too, the definition of a legal term, "reasonable doubt", is presented 
through the supposed reasoning process that the jury will have to go through in 
deliberation when deciding whether the term does or does not apply to the case at 
hand. Just like we may ask ourselves "Where did I just put them?" when we lose 
our keys, jurors are also presented by lawyers in their discourses as asking 
questions to themselves and each other when trying to come up with the right 
verdict.7 It seems that the "definition-application" blend also recruits structure 
from the question-answer conversation frame. Indeed, when asked about his 
frequent use of questions in his definition or introduction of the legal charges, the 
prosecutor in the case explained: 
it may be a question that the jury might have! you know, that . that even though the jury 
hasn't got to ask me that question I think they may ask that question, so I'm gonna ask it for 
them and then I'm gonna respond to it! [ ... ] [I am] answering questions that I think the jury 
will be asking in the jury room. 
Since the jurors remain silent in their seats, and are not supposed to interrupt the 
counsel's argumentation with questions, counsels need to attempt to put 
themselves in the jurors' minds and create the dialogue the jury may otherwise 
engage in. In that sense, the counsel speaks for the jury in a similar way that the 
pet owner speaks for the pet in the lost pet ad in the introduction. The same 
individual in actuality, the public prosecutor uttering the discourse in (3) and (4) 
needs to split himself into multiple identities simultaneously. He needs to be the 
questioner as much as the provider of the answers. At the same time, he is not 
merely splitting himself into a double questioner-answerer role, but he is also 
blending his identity with the jury as audience, and with the different jurors in 
deliberation in the jury room. 
Interestingly, both the definition-application integration and the identity 
blends seem to be grounded on a stabilizing aid or material anchor (Hutchins 
2002). Notice the verdict form that he jury in this case had to fill in: 
7 In the popular OJ. Simpson trial, for instance, the district attorney told the jury: "all you have to 
do is decide is it more probable than not, did he probably do it?". Data from the free on-line 
transcripts of Sharon Rufo, et al. vs. Orenthal James Simpson, et al. case, Los Angeles, CA, 1996. 
Vol.50. Court TV: ww .courttv .com/casefiles/simpson. 
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We, the jury in the above entiled cause, find the defendant, X, [ ... ] 
(GUILTY) (NOT GUILTY) 
And we further find that the above offense ___ willful, deliberate, and 
(was) (was not) 
premeditated, within the meaning of Penal Code section 189 
The jury needs to fill in the blanks with either of the two possibilities that are 
specified for them. The cognitive task assigned to the jury is guided through an 
observable object, the verdict form, with which they need to interact during 
deliberation. This piece of paper undoubtably models the jury's reasoning process 
and the use they make of the definitions of the legal terms they have been told 
about during the trial. As it is, this material anchor contains the specification of 
the precise decisions to be made, the relevant questions to be answered. That is 
where their recollection of the meanings of legal terms needs to be applied. And a 
good litigator knows that, and will try to come up with useful how-to definitions, 









Fig. 2. Jury's deliberation: "Express malice means, was it an intentional killing, 
okay?" 
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In sum, it is clear that the ultimate goal of the litigator giving a definition of a 
legal term to the jury is not to educate them in the law. Rather the ultimate aim is 
to make sure the jury comes to the desired verdict. Thus, the counsel blends 
himself with the different jurors in a single-multiple identity blend, which 
conceptually integrates the present closing argument and the future deliberation. 
At the same time, the imaginary interaction the litigator sets up, draws the jury 
into the conversation, as those that will eventually answer the relevant question 
with him. This integration network has the persuasive power of turning addressees 
into co-constructors of discourse. 
3. FinalreJDarks 
In this paper I have dealt with cases in which a question was produced to prompt 
an imagined situation of communication. In those cases, the schematic conceptual 
structure of situated question-answer interaction served as a frame to structure 
discourse flow and reasoning. I hope to have shown that there exists an 
interrelation between the production of particular question uses and the global 
socio-cultural configuration of the setting in which they occur. In contextualized 
settings, understanding a particular question use and a potential subsequent 
response to it may require more than a look at the semantics of the words or 
construction(s) in which they appear. Lastly, it seems that Conceptual Integration 
theory can be used to account for on-going interaction in institutional contexts. 
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